University of Dayton Law Review
Volume 36

Number 2

Article 3

1-1-2011

Is Saving an Innocent Man a "Fool's Errand"? The Limitations of
the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act on an Original
Writ of Habeas Corpus
Krystal M. Moore
University of Dayton

Follow this and additional works at: https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Moore, Krystal M. (2011) "Is Saving an Innocent Man a "Fool's Errand"? The Limitations of the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act on an Original Writ of Habeas Corpus," University of Dayton
Law Review: Vol. 36: No. 2, Article 3.
Available at: https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol36/iss2/3

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at eCommons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in University of Dayton Law Review by an authorized editor of eCommons. For more
information, please contact mschlangen1@udayton.edu, ecommons@udayton.edu.

Is Saving an Innocent Man a "Fool's Errand"? The Limitations of the Antiterrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act on an Original Writ of Habeas Corpus
Cover Page Footnote
The author would like to thank Anandhi S. Rajan, Esq. and Ella McCown, Esq. for their confidence and
support. The author would also like to thank Professor Staci P. Rucker, Professor Dennis Greene, Dean
Lori Shaw, and the Honorable Michael T. Hall for providing invaluable insight and mentorship needed to
succeed in the study of law.

This comment is available in University of Dayton Law Review: https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol36/iss2/3

IS SAVING AN INNOCENT MAN A “FOOL’S
ERRAND”? THE LIMITATIONS OF THE
ANTITERRORISM AND EFFECTIVE DEATH
PENALTY ACT ON AN ORIGINAL WRIT OF
HABEAS CORPUS PETITION
Krystal M. Moore1
I. INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................... 197
II. BACKGROUND ...................................................................................... 200
A. The Original Writ of Habeas Corpus .............................................. 201
B. The Purpose of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996 ....................................................................................................... 203
C. Statutory Language of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) ................................ 205
D. In re Troy Anthony Davis................................................................. 208
III. ANALYSIS ............................................................................................. 212
A. Section 2254(d)(1) and the Original Writ ....................................... 213
1. The Unreasonable Standard of Section 2254(d)(1) ...................... 213
2. Congressional Intent..................................................................... 214
B. Section 2254(d)(1) Should Not Apply to Actual Innocence
Claims.................................................................................................... 216
V. SAVING AN INNOCENT MAN IS NOT A FOOL’S ERRAND........................ 220
I. INTRODUCTION
When a death row prisoner garners support from diverse
international public figures,2 an antique judicial tool is dusted off,3 and the
1
Staff Writer 2009–2010, University of Dayton Law Review. J.D., B.A. in Political Science and
English. The author would like to thank Anandhi S. Rajan, Esq. and Ella McCown, Esq. for their
confidence and support. The author would also like to thank Professor Staci P. Rucker, Professor Dennis
Greene, Dean Lori Shaw, and the Honorable Michael T. Hall for providing invaluable insight and
mentorship needed to succeed in the study of law.
2
Troy Davis has garnered support from a diverse group of public figures including: Pope Benedict
XVI; former president, Jimmy Carter; Nobel Peace Prize winner, Desmond Tutu; former presidential
candidate, Bob Barr; actress, Susan Sarandon; author of Dead Man Walking, Sister Helen Prejean; death
penalty supporter and former FBI director, William S. Sessions; and the European Parliament. See
Brendan Lowe, Will Georgia Kill an Innocent Man?, TIME, (July 13, 2007), http://www.time.com/time/
nation/article/0,8599,1643384,00.html; see also Brief for Bob Barr et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of
Troy Anthony Davis, In re Davis (Davis V), 130 S. Ct. 1 (2009); Anthony Papa, Susan Sarandon: “Stop
the Execution of Troy Davis”, HUFFINGTON POST, Sept. 21, 2008, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
anthony-papa/susan-sarandon-stop-the-e_b_128086.html; European Parliament Resolution on the Death
Penalty: Notably the Case of Troy Davis, EUR. PARL. DOC. (0358) B6–0358 (2008). On July 10, 2008,
the European Parliament adopted a resolution that “[a]sks that Troy Davis' death sentence be commuted
and, in view of the abundant evidence which might lead to such commutation, for the relevant courts to
grant him a retrial . . . .” European Parliament Resolution of 10 July 2008 on the Death Penalty,
Particularly the Case of Troy Davis, EUR. PARL. DOC. (C 294) 19.
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Supreme Court produces an opinion during its summer recess,4 absent four
Justices,5 undoubtedly the events will produce more questions than answers.
To that end, the Court did not disappoint because legal blogs went into
overdrive searching for answers and meaning in the Court’s one paragraph
decision. On August 17, 2009, the Supreme Court of the United States, on a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus, issued a one paragraph decision in In re
Troy Anthony Davis, which transferred an original writ of habeas corpus to
the district court to hold an evidentiary hearing for a prisoner who had
previously petitioned the Eleventh Circuit for a writ of habeas corpus and
was denied. 6 The Court’s ruling left many questions unanswered, because
with little explanation or guidance the Court transferred the writ to the
district court, despite the fact that the district court may be precluded from
granting relief under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996 (“AEDPA”).7 The Act may restrict the district court from granting
relief because it “bars the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus with respect to
any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings,”
unless an exception to the statute is applicable.8
Since the enactment of the AEDPA, death row prisoners have been
limited to one set of appeals in federal courts, and the federal courts are
required to give an extreme amount of deference to a state court’s prior
rulings when considering a state prisoner’s writ of habeas corpus. The
problems presented by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act’s
limitations are twofold. First, the AEDPA forecloses the Court’s appellate
jurisdiction on writs filed in the lower federal courts, and Title I of the
Act—while it does not specifically mention original writs of habeas corpus
petitions filed under the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction—gives such
extreme deference to a state court’s prior rulings. Thus, if the AEDPA were
3

The United States Supreme Court took an “extraordinary step—one not taken in nearly 50 years,”
when it transferred Troy Davis’ petition for a writ of habeas corpus to the United States District Court for
the Southern District of Georgia and ordered the court to hold an evidentiary hearing to determine
whether Davis could clearly show that he was innocent of the crime for which he was convicted. Davis
V, 130 S. Ct. at 2 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The prior use of the Court’s habeas appellate jurisdiction,
“made the original writ an ‘anachronism.’” Palmore v. Superior Court of D.C., 515 F.2d 1294, 1301
(D.C. Cir. 1975); see also Dallin H. Oaks, The “Original” Writ of Habeas Corpus in the Supreme Court,
1962 SUP. CT. REV. 153, 206. “Prisoners have been trying for nearly 50 years without success to get the
Justices to employ this ‘original jurisdiction.’” David Von Drehle, Davis Ruling Raises New DeathPenalty
Questions,
TIME,
Aug.
18,
2009,
http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/
0,8599,1917118,00.html.
4
The United States Supreme Court’s term begins, as required by Supreme Court Rule 4.1, on the
first Monday in October, and “continue[s] until late June or early July.” SUP. CT. R. 4.1; see also The
Court and Its Procedures (Jan. 31, 2011, 6:53 PM), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/about/
procedures.pdf. During the summer, the Court prepares for cases scheduled for fall argument. Id.
5
Davis V, 130 S.Ct. at 1–2. Chief Justice Roberts, and Justices Alito, Sotomayor, and Kennedy did
not take part in the opinion. Id. The concurrence was written by Justice Stevens and joined by Justices
Ginsburg and Breyer. Id. The dissent was written by Justice Scalia and joined by Justice Thomas. Id.
6
Id.; In re Davis (Davis IV), 565 F.3d 810, 827 (11th Cir. 2009).
7
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104–132, 110 Stat.
1214 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
8
Davis V, 130 S. Ct. at 2 (internal quotation omitted).
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to apply to original writs of habeas corpus petitions filed directly in the
Supreme Court, as well as writs filed in the lower federal courts, then the
Court would, virtually, be stripped of its ability to determine whether a
prisoner is in custody, in violation of his constitutional rights. Section 104
of the Act amended 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) to give such extreme deference
to the state courts that even if the Supreme Court were to determine that the
prisoner had a meritorious claim the Court would have to conclude that the
state court was unreasonable in its decision before the Court could grant
relief. Second, the Act may preclude federal courts from hearing actual
innocence claims,9 leading to the confinement and execution of innocent
men and offending the Eighth Amendment of the United States
Constitution.10 The first problem presented is the primary focus of this
Comment.
The AEDPA’s limitations on federal writs of habeas corpus should
not apply to petitions for original writs of habeas corpus filed under the
Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction. At the very least, the Act’s
limitations should not apply to actual innocence claims. The limitations
should not apply to original petitions filed under the Court’s original
jurisdiction and actual innocence claims because such limitations would be
contrary to Congress’ intent and to the Constitution. This Comment
explores the limiting effects of the AEDPA if applied to original petitions
for writs of habeas corpus and to actual innocence claims. Section II
provides background on original petitions for a writ of habeas corpus and
examines the purpose and language of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996 and 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Section II also gives an
overview of the Court’s concurring and dissenting opinions in In re Troy
Anthony Davis.
Finally, Section III examines the issues presented by the AEDPA,
specifically amended by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), as it relates to original
writs of habeas corpus and actual innocence claims. It further focuses on
the Court’s prior treatment of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act in different cases and how the Act intersected with writs of habeas
corpus prior to the Davis case. Section 2254(d)(1) should not apply to
original writs or actual innocence claims because it was not Congress’ intent
to kill innocent men. In America, preservation of human life is not a fool’s
errand.
9
Davis v. Terry (Davis III), 465 F.3d 1249, 1251 (11th Cir. 2006). There are “two types of claims
pertaining to actual innocence that might be made after trial.” Id. The first one is a Herrera claim, a
“substantive claim of actual innocence,” which claims that the “execution of an innocent person violates
the Eighth Amendment, even if [the] conviction was the product of a fair trial.” Id. (emphasis in original).
The second one is a Schlup claim, a “procedural claim,” which asserts that the “conviction of an innocent
person is constitutionally impermissible when the conviction was the product of an unfair trial.” Id.
(emphasis in original).
10
See U.S. CONST. amend XIII (barring cruel and unusual punishment).
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II. BACKGROUND
Since Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act in 1996, the requirement that federal courts must give deference
to a state court’s prior rulings when reviewing a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) has never been applied to an original
writ of habeas corpus arising under the Supreme Court’s original
jurisdiction.11 Since Title I of the Act fails to mention the Court’s authority
to entertain original writs12 and the Supreme Court has not granted an
original writ in decades,13 the Court has upheld the constitutionality of the
Act,14 leaving the question open as to whether the Act applies to original
writs, and, if so, to what extent.15 Similarly, the Court has never addressed
whether the Act bars actual innocence claims.16 These questions have led to
uncertainty within the courts as to the current state of federal habeas law.17
This section provides background on the original writ of habeas corpus,
explores the purpose of the AEDPA and the language of 28 U.S.C. §
2254(d)(1), and reviews the case that brought these issues to the forefront,
11

See Davis V, 130 S. Ct. at 2–3 (questioning whether § 2254(d)(1) applies to original writs, and if
so, to what extent).
12
See Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 660 (1996) (The Court supported its conclusion that the
AEDPA did not repeal its appellate jurisdiction by noting that “[n]o provision of Title I mentions our
authority to entertain original habeas [corpus] petitions . . . .”); see also AEDPA, Pub. L. No. 104-132,
110 Stat. 1214, 1217–26.
13
Davis V, 130 S. Ct. at 2 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
14
See Felker, 518 U.S. at 654 (“[T]he operative provisions of the Act do not violate the Suspension
Clause of the Constitution, Art. I, § 9.”); see also id. at 667 (Souter, Stevens & Breyer, JJ., concurring)
(“I have no difficulty with the conclusion that the statute is not on its face, or as applied here,
unconstitutional.”) (emphasis added).
15
Davis V, 130 S. Ct. at 1; see also Felker, 518 U.S. at 663.
16
See Triestman v. United States, 124 F.3d 361, 363 (2d Cir. 1997) (considering whether the judicial
system afforded relief for a prisoner who has established that he is actually innocent, but the AEDPA
appeared to bar relief). The Triestman court noted that “serious constitutional questions would arise if a
person who can prove his actual innocence on the existing record—and who could not have effectively
raised his claim of innocence at an earlier time—had no access to judicial review.” Id.; see also Davis V,
130 S. Ct. at 3 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“This Court has never held that the Constitution forbids the
execution of a convicted defendant who has had a full and fair trial but is later able to convince a habeas
court that he is ‘actually’ innocent. Quite to the contrary, we have repeatedly left that question
unresolved, while expressing considerable doubt that any claim based on alleged ‘actual innocence’ is
constitutionally cognizable.”) (second emphasis added).
17
Courts that have interpreted Davis V have given various meanings to the Court’s opinions. See
United States v. Cirilo-Munoz, 582 F.3d 54, 56 (1st Cir. 2009) (Torruella, J., concurring) (“Although
Cirilo-Munoz presents no new evidence of actual innocence here, the fact that the Supreme Court is
willing to revisit a conviction even older than Cirilo-Munoz’s provides some hope that the Supreme
Court . . . would revisit Cirilo-Munoz’s conviction should he procure new evidence of his actual
innocence. In fact, if Justice Scalia’s claim is true, then Davis [V] leaves open just how ‘new’ the
evidence has to be to permit a court to review Cirilo-Munoz’s conviction.”) (internal citation omitted);
see also Wright v. Marshall, No. 98-10507-PBS, 2009 US Dist. LEXIS 105276, at *2 (D. Mass. Nov. 9,
2009) (Defendant produced evidence that another man admitted that he killed the victim. However, the
court noted that “[t]he Supreme Court has not recognized actual innocence as a ground for federal habeas
relief.”); Wilson v. City of Ponchatoula, 18 So. 3d 1272 (La. 2009) (“A court of law, in order to protect
its own integrity, has the authority to set aside judgments that are fundamentally flawed.”) (emphasis in
original) (citing Davis V, 130 S. Ct. at 1-2); cf., Petty v. Padula, No. 0:08–2967–RBH, 2009 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 86397, at *6 (D.S.C. Sept. 21, 2009) (“The United States Supreme Court has not established an
exception to the AEDPA one-year statute of limitations based on ‘actual innocence’ in non-capital
cases.”) (citing Davis V, 130 S. Ct. at 1).
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In re Troy Anthony Davis.
A. The Original Writ of Habeas Corpus
The writ of habeas corpus began as “an auxiliary device,” that
produced a prisoner before the court.18 Today the writ serves as an innocent
prisoner’s last attempt to get a conviction overturned.19 The United States
Supreme Court and federal courts have the power to grant a writ of habeas
corpus.20 Therefore, a prisoner may petition for a writ of habeas corpus
either by petitioning a federal court or by petitioning the United States
Supreme Court directly.21
The United States Constitution vests the Supreme Court with
original jurisdiction22 and appellate jurisdiction.23 The Supreme Court’s
original jurisdiction over a petition for writ of habeas corpus that is filed
directly with the Court24 actually falls within its appellate jurisdiction.25
Congress may regulate and make exceptions to the Court’s appellate
jurisdiction;26 however, Congress has never divested the Court of any of its
original jurisdiction over original writs for habeas corpus petitions.27
18

Oaks, supra note 3, at 175.
See CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 33391, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS: A BRIEF
LEGAL OVERVIEW 1 (2006), (“[T]he last refuge of scoundrels and the last hope of the innocent.”).
20
28 U.S.C. § 2241(a) (2006) (corresponds to Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 81, ch. 20, § 14).
21
Id.
22
The Court’s original jurisdiction is limited to the specified cases in Article II, section 2, clause 2
of the United States Constitution. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2 (“In all Cases affecting Ambassadors,
other public Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be Party, the supreme Court shall
have original Jurisdiction.”) (emphasis added); see also Oaks, supra note 3, at 156 (The Court’s “original
jurisdiction [is] limited to the cases specified in Article III, §2, cl. 2 of the Constitution . . . .”).
23
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2 (“In all the other Cases before mentioned, the supreme Court shall
have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations
as the Congress shall make.”) (emphasis added).
24
A petition for writ of habeas corpus that is filed directly in the Supreme Court is commonly
referred to as an original writ of habeas corpus. See Oaks, supra note 3, at 155.
25
Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 14 Stat. 81–82 (1789) (“That all the before-mentioned courts of the
United States, shall have power to issue writs of scire facias, habeas corpus, and all other writs not
specifically provided for by statute, which may be necessary for the exercise of their respective
jurisdictions, and agreeable to the principles and usages of law. And that either of the justices of the
supreme court, as well as judges of the district courts, shall have power to grant writs of habeas corpus
for the purpose of an inquiry into the cause of commitment.—Provided, That writs of habeas corpus
shall in no case extend to prisoners in gaol, unless where they are in custody, under or by colour of the
authority of the United States, or are committed for trial before some court of the same, or are necessary
to be brought into court to testify.”) (emphasis in original); Oaks, supra note 3, at 154 (“The so-called
‘original writ of habeas corpus’ is not ‘original’ in the sense that it issues in the exercise of the Court’s
original jurisdiction. With [only] a few exceptions . . . the Supreme Court can only issue the writ under
its appellate jurisdiction.”) (internal citations omitted); see also Palmore v. Superior Court of D.C., 515
F.2d 1294, 1301 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Ex parte Bollman & Ex parte Swartwout, 8 U.S. 75 (1807) (finding
that the Court had no common law or inherent authority to grant the writ).
26
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2 (“In all the other Cases before mentioned, the supreme Court shall
have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations
as the Congress shall make.”) (emphasis added).
27
See Palmore, 515 F.2d at 1302 n.19 (considering the constitutionality of a statute that would
“divest[] the Supreme Court for the first time in . . . history of some of its ‘original’ habeas jurisdiction . .
. .”) (emphasis added).
19
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An original writ of habeas corpus is an extraordinary remedy.28 If
the remedy is granted, then a federal judge may issue a writ of habeas
corpus that either overturns a prisoner’s conviction, reduces his sentence, or
remands his case for retrial or resentencing.29 In contrast to a writ of
certiorari30 and a writ of error,31 an original writ of habeas corpus is not a
judicial tool that corrects mere errors or irregularities in trial court
proceedings that would render the judgment voidable.32 The Court does not
entertain an original writ of habeas corpus where the petition raises factual
issues.33 The Court may, however, exercise its statutory power of transfer
and transfer an original writ to a court in the proper jurisdiction to review
the factual issues.34
The Supreme Court has rarely used its original jurisdiction to grant
original writs.35 The reasons for the Court’s rare use of the original writ are
twofold. First, Rule 20, which governs the procedures that a prisoner must
follow on a petition for an original writ of habeas corpus,36 requires that a
prisoner “must show . . . that exceptional circumstances warrant the exercise
of the Court’s discretionary powers . . . .”37 The Supreme Court has great
latitude to dictate the type of circumstances that constitute exceptional
circumstances as required by Rule 20.38 Second, the Court has rarely
exercised its original jurisdiction to grant original writs because of the other
“direct avenues of appellate review of criminal convictions” available to the
28
See Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 621 (1998); see also Goto v. Lane, 265 U.S. 393,
401–02 (1924) (“The remedy is an extraordinary one, out of the usual course, and involves a collateral
attack on the process or judgment constituting the basis of the detention. The instances in which it is
granted, when the law has provided another remedy in regular course, are exceptional and usually
confined to situations where there is peculiar and pressing need for it or where the process or judgment
under which the prisoner is held is wholly void.”).
29
ROGER A. HANSON & HENRY W. K. DAILEY, U.S. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE, NCJ–155504, FEDERAL
HABEAS CORPUS REVIEW: CHALLENGING STATE COURT CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS iv (1995).
30
A writ of certiorari is “[a]n extraordinary writ issued by an appellate court, at its discretion,
directing a lower court to deliver the record in the case for review.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 258 (9th
ed. 2009).
31
A writ of error is “[a] writ issued by an appellate court directing a lower court to deliver the record
in the case for review.” Id. at 1749.
32
See Oaks, supra note 3, at 192.
33
Id. at 192–93 (“[T]he ‘original’ writ is suitable only where the petitioner’s claim for discharge
presents only a legal question.”).
34
28 U.S.C. § 2241(b) (“The Supreme Court, any justice thereof, and any circuit judge may decline
to entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus and may transfer the application for hearing and
determination to the district court having jurisdiction to entertain it.”) (emphasis added); see also Oaks,
supra note 3, at 194 (“In 1948 Congress gave the Court an alternative to denial of petitions involving
factual issues by providing that the Supreme Court or any of its Justices or any circuit judge ‘may decline
to entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus and may transfer the application for hearing and
determination to the district court having jurisdiction to entertain it.’”).
35
SUP. CT. R. 20.4(a) (“This writ is rarely granted.”); see also Palmore v. Superior Court of D.C.,
515 F.2d 1294, 1301 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (“[T]he Court . . . has granted an original writ only three times” in
the twentieth century.) (emphasis added).
36
SUP. CT. R. 20.
37
SUP. CT. R. 20.1 (emphasis added).
38
Id. (“Issuance by the Court of an extraordinary writ [for habeas corpus] is not a matter of right, but
of discretion sparingly exercised.”); see also Palmore, 515 F.2d at 1301 n.18 (“The exercise of original
habeas corpus jurisdiction is extremely discretionary.”).
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Court.39 In the past, the Court utilized its authority to review a federal
court’s denial of a prisoner’s habeas corpus petition by employing the writ
of error or by granting certiorari.40 While the use of the original writ of
habeas corpus to grant relief has been rare throughout the Court’s history,41
the Court has used its original jurisdiction when Congress foreclosed its
other direct avenues, such as appeal or writ of certiorari, to review criminal
convictions.42 In this respect, history has repeated itself. Congress has,
again, through its enactment of the AEDPA, foreclosed the Court’s ability to
review criminal convictions by certiorari or by appeal.43
B. The Purpose of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996
Federal habeas corpus has been an evolving body of law. Congress
has expanded and narrowed the writ repeatedly since it first conferred the
powers to grant the writ on the courts. During its first session, Congress
enacted the Judiciary Act of 1789, which authorized the Supreme Court, as
well as the federal courts, “to grant writs of habeas corpus [only] for the
purpose of an inquiry into the cause of commitment” of federal prisoners.44
Congress made its first significant change to the writ in 1867 by enacting the
Judiciary Act of 1867, which amended the 1789 Act.45 The Judiciary Act of
1867 afforded state prisoners, as well as federal prisoners, access to the writ
of habeas corpus.46 Thereafter, in subsequent amendments, Congress
39

Oaks, supra note 3, at 182.
Id. 181–82 (“In 1885 Congress provided an appeal to the Supreme Court from the decisions of
lower federal courts on habeas corpus petitions, and in 1891 Congress made the writ of error generally
available to review criminal judgments in the federal courts. As the Supreme Court soon observed, these
direct avenues of appellate review of criminal convictions left very little occasion for the exercise of the
‘original’ writ.”).
41
See supra note 35.
42
See Oaks, supra note 3, at 182.
43
28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(E) (“The grant or denial of an authorization by a court of appeals to file a
second or successive application shall not be appealable and shall not be the subject of a petition for
rehearing or for a writ of certiorari.”) (emphasis added). Felker provided the Court with one of its first
opportunities to review the AEDPA. See Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 661 (1996). In Felker, the
Court noted that “[t]he Act does remove [the Court’s] authority to entertain an appeal or a petition for a
writ of certiorari to review a decision of a court of appeals . . . .” Id. (emphasis added).
44
Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 73, 81–82 (“And that either of the justices of the
supreme court, as well as judges of the district courts, shall have power to grant writs of habeas corpus
for the purpose of an inquiry into the cause of commitment.—Provided, That writs of habeas corpus
shall in no case extend to prisoners in gaol, unless where they are in custody, under or by colour of the
authority of the United States, or [were] committed for trial before some court of the same . . . .”)
(emphasis in original); see also Felker, 518 U.S. at 659; Doyle, supra note 19, at 3 (quoting 1 Stat. 73,
81–82).
45
See Felker, 518 U.S. at 659 (“Congress greatly expanded the scope of the federal habeas corpus in
1867 . . . .”); see also Doyle, supra note 19, at 4–5.
46
Judiciary Act of 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385, 385–386 (“[I]n addition to the authority already
conferred by law, shall have power to grant writs of habeas corpus in all cases where any person[s] may
be restrained of his or her liberty in violation of the constitution, or of any treaty or law of the United
States . . . .”) (emphasis added). However, prisoners were not able to collaterally attack their convictions,
unless the sentencing court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Doyle, supra note 19, at 5–6. Thus, even if
a state prisoner had a constitutional claim, he “could not be granted federal habeas relief until all
possibility of state judicial relief—trial, appellate, and post-conviction—had been exhausted.” Id.
40
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narrowed federal habeas law in response to abuses of the writ.47
In the early 1940s, “the Court stopped requiring that an alleged
constitutional violation void the jurisdiction of the trial court[s] before
federal habeas relief could be considered.”48 In response, federal prisoners
abused the writ, which led to complaints from federal judges.49 Therefore,
in 1948, Congress, in direct response to the complaints about the Court’s
actions, revised the Judiciary Act of 1867.50
In another attempt to remedy prior problems that surrounded the
writ, particularly in capital habeas cases, Congress revised the federal
habeas law by its enactment of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996.51 Similar to the prior revisions of federal habeas law,
Congress enacted the AEDPA to curb abuses of the writ by giving deference
to state courts.52 Congress specified three purposes for the Act: “to deter
terrorism, provide justice for victims, [and] provide for an effective death
penalty . . . .”53
The problems that surrounded the writ before the passage of the
AEDPA were clear. Existing procedures afforded the incentive and
opportunity for delay.54 For example, “[a] state defendant convicted of a
capital offense and sentenced to death could take advantage of three
successive procedures to challenge constitutional defects in his or her
conviction or sentence.”55 The prisoner could effectively raise his/her
claims on appeal, in state habeas proceedings, and in federal habeas
proceedings.56 Consequently, victims were not able to receive justice, as
there were extensive delays between sentencing and execution of sentence.57
Additional problems included the fact that state court interpretations
or applications of federal law were not binding in subsequent federal habeas
proceedings.58 Federal courts reviewed de novo state court decisions on
questions of law and mixed questions of law and fact.59 Complaints of delay
and wasted judicial resources marked the debate that led to passage of the
AEDPA, with opponents contending that federal judges should decide
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58

See Doyle, supra note 19, at 7.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 10–11.
Id. at 14.
AEDPA, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, 1214.
Doyle, supra note 19, at 10–11.
Id. at 11
Id. at 10-11
Id. at 11.
See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 400 (O’Connor, J., concurring); see Doyle, supra note 19,

at 14.

59

See BRIAN R. MEANS, FEDERAL HABEAS MANUAL: A GUIDE TO FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS
LITIGATION § 3.1 (2010 ed. 2010).
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federal law.60
The enactment of the AEDPA on April 26, 1996, made two
significant changes when it sought to curb abuses of federal habeas law by
precluding a prisoner from second or successive petitions for writ of habeas
corpus in the federal courts. First, the AEDPA foreclosed the Supreme
Court’s authority to review a federal court’s denial of a prisoner’s habeas
corpus petition by granting a writ of certiorari,61 which made the federal
courts’ denials final.62 This change is significant because Congress’ ability
to regulate and make exceptions to the Court’s direct avenues of appellate
review of criminal convictions, or otherwise termed appellate jurisdiction,
has previously made the Court rely on its original jurisdiction over original
petitions for writ of habeas corpus to review criminal convictions.63 The
second significant change that resulted from the enactment of the AEDPA
was in how federal courts reviewed state court adjudications.64 Most
significantly, the AEDPA amended 28 U.S.C. § 2254 to give more
deference to a state court’s prior rulings that limit grants on applications for
writ of habeas corpus.65
C. Statutory Language of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)
Section 104 of the AEDPA amends 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)66 by
adjusting the weight accorded to prior state court rulings.67 Specifically, 28
U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) provides:
(d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a
person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court
shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was
adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless
the adjudication of the claim—(1) resulted in a decision that
was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of,
clearly established Federal law, as determined by the
Supreme Court of the United States . . . .68
According to the plain meaning of section 2254(d), a federal court
60

See Doyle, supra note 19, at 14.
See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
62
See Peter Hack, The Roads Less Traveled: Post Conviction Relief Alternatives and the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 30 AM. J. CRIM. L. 171, 176 (2003) (“[T]wo of
the most important themes of the Court’s recent habeas jurisprudence [are] federalism and finality. By
crafting a standard that will insulate incorrect state court decisions, the Supreme Court has created a new
conception of federalism in the habeas context.”).
63
See Oaks, supra note 3, at 182; see also supra Part II.A.
64
MEANS, supra note 59, § 3.1; see Jimenez v. Walker, 458 F.3d 130, 141 (2d Cir. 2006).
65
See Doyle, supra note 19, at 14–15.
66
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
67
See CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 96-499A, ANTITERRORISM AND EFFECTIVE
DEATH PENALTY ACT OF 1996: A SUMMARY 6 (1996).
68
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). “[B]oth, ‘contrary to’ and ‘unreasonable application’ must be given
separate effect.” Hack, supra note 62, at 176.
61
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reviewing a state prisoner’s application for a writ of habeas corpus must
deny relief if the prisoner’s claim was adjudicated on the merits in state
court proceedings.69 Indeed, a federal court may not grant relief in
accordance with section 2254(d)(1), unless the state court’s decision was
contrary to or was so off the mark that it was an unreasonable application of
clearly established federal law.70 Moreover, a court’s decision cannot be
unreasonable if the law or rule was not a part of the Court’s holding.71 The
Court’s dicta is insufficient to meet the clearly established law requirement
exception under section 2254(d)(1).72 Thus, federal courts must deny
habeas corpus relief for a prisoner if the relief is contingent upon a rule or
law that is not clearly established at the time the prisoner’s conviction
became final.73
Second, section 2254(d)(1) requires the state court’s prior ruling to
be more than incorrect. Federal courts may not grant habeas relief based on
its “independent interpretation and application of federal law.”74 It is
insufficient for a federal court to grant habeas relief, even where a federal
court has a “firm conviction that the state court was erroneous.”75 Likewise,
even if a federal court concludes that the state court applied clearly
established federal law incorrectly, it is insufficient for the federal court to
grant relief.76 The application of the law must be objectively unreasonable,
regardless of the fact that other jurists have applied the federal law in a
manner that is different from the state court’s application.77 An objectively
unreasonable application exists where the state court (1) correctly identified
the governing legal rule, but (2) applied the rule unreasonably to the facts of
the prisoner’s case.78 The language of unreasonable application in section
69

See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).
See id.; see also Impact of Federal Habeas Corpus Limitations on Death Penalty Appeals:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties of the H. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 24 (2009) (statement of Gerald Kogan, C.J. (Retired), Florida Supreme Court)
[hereinafter Capitol Hill Hearing].
71
See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“‘[C]learly established
Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,’” refers to “the holdings, as
opposed to the dicta, of this Court’s decisions as of the time of the relevant state-court decision.”);
Wright v. Van Patten, 552 U.S. 120, 126 (2008) (holding that the state court could not have unreasonably
applied clearly established federal law because the Court’s cases gave “no clear answer to the question
presented, let alone one” in the prisoner’s favor).
72
See Williams, 529 U.S. at 412.
73
Id. at 413.
74
Adam N. Steinman, Reconceptualizing Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners: How Should
AEDPA’s Standard of Review Operate After Williams v. Taylor?, 2001 WIS. L. REV. 1493, 1494 (2001)
(internal citation omitted).
75
Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003) (quoting VanTran v. Lindsey, 212 F.3d 1143, 1153–
54 (9th Cir. 2000)) (internal quotations omitted).
76
See Williams, 529 U.S. at 411; see also Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 793 (2001) (“[E]ven if
the federal habeas court concludes that the state court decision applied clearly established federal law
incorrectly, relief is appropriate only if that application is also objectively unreasonable.”).
77
See Williams, 529 U.S. at 377–78.
78
Id. at 407–08 (A state court’s decision is an unreasonable application of the Court’s clearly
established precedent if it “correctly identifies the governing legal rule but applies it unreasonably to the
facts of a particular prisoner’s case . . . .”).
70
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2254(d)(1) requires the federal courts to give extreme deference to state
court decisions.79
This heightened deference standard is problematic because it
undercuts a federal court’s ability to determine if a state prisoner is in
custody, in violation of the Constitution.80 State courts can prevent federal
courts from overturning their decisions by providing less explanation in
their opinions.81 Such actions from state courts preclude federal courts from
ever meeting the heightened unreasonable standard required by section
2254(d)(1).82 Moreover, instead of reducing conflicts between the state and
federal courts, section 2254(d)(1) actually exacerbates tension between the
state and federal courts.83 Assuming the state court’s decision is not
contrary to clearly established federal law, the federal courts will have to
deem the state court’s application of the law so off the mark that it was
unreasonable to satisfy the requirements of section 2254(d)(1).84
Unanswered questions about the constitutionality of the Act remain.
It is still unclear whether section 2254(d)(1) applies to an original petition at
all—or in the alternative—with the same rigidity as a successive writ.85 In
addition, it is unclear whether section 2254(d)(1) bars judicial review of

79
“The standard [of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)] is even more disturbing. It gives extreme deference to
State court decisions.” Capitol Hill Hearing, supra note 70 (statement of Rep. Nadler, Chair, H. Comm.
on the Judiciary). Unreasonable is “not equivalent to ‘incorrect.’” Hack, supra note 62, at 176.
80
Capitol Hill Hearing, supra note 70 (testifying that “§ 2254(d)(1) deprives federal courts of the
ability to vindicate constitutional rights.”); see also Hack, supra note 62, at 177 (exploring avenues of
relief that may be available to state prisoners, other than § 2254, in order to avoid the high standards of
deference of § 2254(d)).
81
Capitol Hill Hearing, supra note 70, at 43 (statement of John H. Blume, Professor of Law,
Director, Cornell Death Penalty Project, Cornell University Law School).
82
Capitol Hill Hearing, supra note 70, at 45 (statement of Nadler) (clarifying Blume’s point by
inquiring, “[t]he less they say the more deference they get because they don’t say enough to hang
themselves?”).
83
See Andrea A. Kochan, The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996: Habeas
Corpus Reform?, 52 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 399, 399 (1997) (“[T]he poor drafting of the Act
exacerbates existing problems and creates a host of new issues to be considered.”); Capitol Hill Hearing,
supra note 70, at 25 (statement of Kogan) (The witness testified that “§2254(d)(1) exacerbates friction
between federal courts and state courts.”).
84
Capitol Hill Hearing, supra note 70, at 25 (statement of Kogan) (“State courts are used to the idea
that their judgments may be effectively upset if federal courts conclude that they have made a mistake.”
However, they are “not used to being told that their judgments are so far from the mark as to be
unreasonable.”) (emphasis in original); see also Doyle, supra note 19, at 14–15; Rompilla v. Beard, 545
U.S. 374, 380 (2005) (quoting Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 520 (2003)); Lockyer v. Andrade, 538
U.S. 63, 75-76 (2003) (“It is not enough that a federal habeas court, in its ‘independent review of the
legal question,’ is left with a ‘firm conviction’ that the state court was ‘erroneous.’ We have held
precisely the opposite: ‘Under §2254(d)(1)’s “unreasonable application” clause . . . a federal habeas court
may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant
state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly.’ Rather, that
application must be objectively unreasonable.” (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted) (quoting
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 411 (2000))); Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 699 (2002); Woodford v.
Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 27 (2002).
85
Davis V, 130 S. Ct. 1 (2009); see Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 663 (1996) (leaving open the
question whether and to what extent the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 applies to
original petitions).
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certain actual innocence claims.86
D. In re Troy Anthony Davis
The United States Supreme Court’s recent decision in Davis
illustrates the unanswered issues surrounding the AEDPA and how, or if, the
Act is applicable to original writs or actual innocence claims. By way of
background, Troy Davis is a death row inmate.87 The evidence is
undisputed that Davis was present with a friend when Mark MacPhail, an
off-duty police officer,88 was murdered in 1989.89 Officer MacPhail
responded to yells for help from Larry Young, a homeless man who was in a
parking lot across from where the officer was working as a security guard.90
However, the evidence was not so clear on whether Davis or his friend
committed the murder.91 The murder weapon was never found,92 and Davis’
friend went to the police and informed them that Davis had pulled the
trigger.93 This statement began Davis’ journey through the criminal justice
system.
The Georgia Resource Center (GRC) represented Davis at his trial
and throughout most of his criminal proceedings.94 During Davis’ trial,
State presented testimony of nine witnesses,95 which ultimately resulted in
Davis’ 1991 conviction for the fatal shooting of Officer MacPhail.96 After
his conviction, Davis maintained his innocence.
Throughout the years, Davis has sought to get his conviction
overturned at the state level by citing mistaken identity and various
procedural defects.97 Some of the issues maintained on appeal were
obviously insufficient, but the issues presented were a desperate attempt to
get Davis’ conviction overturned. Most notably, the GRC appealed Davis’
conviction on jury selection issues, even though Davis is an African
American male, whose jury was 58% African American (seven African
Americans and five Caucasians).98 Unsurprisingly, the courts concluded
86
87
88
89
90
91

See Triestman v. United States, 124 F.3d 361, 377–380 (2d Cir. 1997).
Davis IV, 565 F.3d 810, 813 (11th Cir. 2009).
Davis V, 130 S. Ct. at 2.
Davis IV, 565 F.3d at 813.
Davis V, 130 S. Ct. at 2.
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, In re Davis, No. 08-1443, 2008 U.S. Briefs 1443, 1 (May 19,

2009).
92
93
94
95

Id. at 3.
Id.
Lowe, supra note 2.
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, In re Davis, No. 08-1443, 2008 U.S. Briefs 1443, 5 (May 19,

2009).
96

Id.
Davis v. State (Davis I), 263 Ga. 5 (1993) (Georgia Supreme Court affirmed Davis’ conviction);
Davis v. Turpin (Davis II), 273 Ga. 244 (2000) (Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the state court’s denial
of Davis’ habeas corpus petition relief); Davis III, 465 F.3d 1249 (11th Cir. 2006) (Davis filed his first
federal habeas corpus petition on December 14, 2001.).
98
See Davis I, 263 Ga. at 7.
97
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that the jury selection issues were unfounded because the county was 2/3
Caucasian and the majority of the jury was African American.99
With nine witnesses testifying for the state, the events that led to the
tragic death of Officer MacPhail seemed certain, until seven of State’s key
witnesses recanted their testimony.100 Dorothy Ferrell identified Davis at his
trial as the shooter.101 However, in 2000, she stated in an affidavit that she
“saw nothing and testified falsely.”102 Ms. Ferrell explained that she was on
parole and felt compelled to identify Davis.103 She further explained that the
detective only showed her one photograph, a picture of Davis.104 She
claimed to not see anything, as she was standing over 150 feet from the dark
parking lot.105 Ms. Ferrell also admitted that the district attorney promised
to help her while she was in jail.106 Ferrell disclosed her false testimony to a
friend, who subsequently called Davis’ trial counsel and reported her
perjury.107 Another witness, Darrell Collins, who was sixteen years old at
the time, recanted his testimony in 2002.108 Collins alleged in his affidavit
that police threatened him with jail time; therefore, he testified falsely.109
Another significant witness who recanted his testimony was Larry Young,
the homeless man who called out for help during the altercation.110 In a
2002 affidavit, Mr. Young stated that he could not remember what the
different people were wearing the night of his beating.111 Mr. Young’s
statement explained why he had trouble distinguishing Davis from his friend
at Davis’ trial.112 The other recantations were similar; the witnesses either
were pressured by the police or implicated Davis because it was his face on
the wanted posters instead of his friend.113
Davis’ attorney concedes that the evidence may have been available
during his initial appeals; however, at the time of Davis’ post-conviction
proceedings, Congress had eliminated $20 million to post-conviction
defender organizations, which directly affected the GRC.114 Six of the eight

99

See id.
See Davis V, 130 S. Ct. 1, 1–2 (2009). Among the witnesses that recanted their testimony were
three eyewitnesses that identified Davis at his trial as Officer MacPhail’s shooter. Davis IV, 565 F.3d
810, 815 (11th Cir. 2009).
101
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, In re Davis, No. 08-1443, 2008 U.S. Briefs 1443, 5
(explaining that Ferrell failed to disclose material exculpatory evidence).
102
Id.
103
Id.
104
Id.
105
Id.
106
Id.
107
Id.
108
Id. at 6.
109
Id.
110
Id.
111
Id.
112
Id.
113
Id. at 6–7.
114
Lowe, supra note 2.
100
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attorneys at the GRC left, as well as three of the four investigators.115 The
attorney handling Davis’ claim after this had eighty other cases.116 By her
own admission in her affidavit, the focus of the office became to avert
disaster.117 While going through the appeals process of Davis’ conviction,
she knew that witnesses should have been interviewed; however, the office
did not have the resources to do so.118 Thus, the recantation of testimony
and other exculpatory evidence went unheard while Davis’ case went
through the appeals process.119
On December 14, 2001, Davis filed his first habeas petition in the
United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia.120 Davis
alleged that the prosecutor knowingly presented false evidence, that the
prosecutor failed to disclose material exculpatory evidence, and that he
received ineffective assistance of counsel.121 The district court denied
Davis’ habeas corpus petition and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district
court’s denial.122
When the witnesses recanted and submitted affidavits, Davis sought
to get his conviction overturned with the new evidence.123 However,
Congress’ enactment of the AEDPA in 1996 presented new obstacles for
Davis. Because Davis filed a habeas corpus petition in 2001,124 the AEDPA
required him to file an application with the Eleventh Circuit seeking
authorization to file a second or successive federal habeas petition.125 This
new requirement meant that Davis would not be able to file a second or
successive habeas petition in federal district court unless a three-judge panel
of a United States Court of Appeals determined that Davis’ application
relied on facts that could not have been discovered previously through the
exercise of due diligence.126 The new evidence “must be sufficient to
establish by clear and convincing evidence that, but for constitutional error,
no reasonable factfinder would have found [Davis] guilty of the underlying
offense.”127 This filing was the first time that Davis had raised his
freestanding actual innocence claim.128 The Eleventh Circuit concluded that
Davis did not meet his burden and denied his application to file a second or

115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Davis IV, 565 F.3d 810, 813 (11th Cir. 2009).
Id.
Davis III, 465 F.3d 1249, 1250–51, 1256 (11th Cir. 2006).
See Davis IV, 565 F.3d at 814.
Davis’ first federal habeas petition was filed on December 14, 2001. Id. at 813.
Id.
Id. at 816 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(B)(ii)).
Id. at 823 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(B)(ii)) (internal quotations omitted).
Id. at 813.
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successive habeas petition.129 The court reasoned that a showing of actual
innocence alone was insufficient and that section 2244(b)(2)(B)(ii) is “an
actual innocence plus standard.”130 The court’s message was that under
section 2244(b)(B)(ii) innocence is not enough to satisfy the statute.131 A
constitutional violation must accompany the new evidence.132
Next, Davis filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus directly in
the Supreme Court.133 The NAACP, former prosecutors, and members of
the judiciary filed amici curiae briefs in support of Troy Davis’ original writ
of habeas corpus petition.134 The Court took an extraordinary measure;135 it
transferred, instead of denying, the original writ.136 During the Court’s
summer recess,137 it produced an opinion that was only one paragraph in
length.138 The Court concluded that Davis should be granted an evidentiary
hearing and transferred the original writ to the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Georgia to determine whether Davis’ affidavits
clearly established his innocence.139 Justice Stevens wrote the concurring
opinion140 and Justice Scalia wrote the dissenting opinion;141 however,
noticeably, four Justices did not take part in the decisions.142
Justice Stevens’ concurrence supported the Court’s majority opinion
to transfer the writ back to the district court over Justice Scalia’s strong
dissent, which called the transfer “a fool’s errand.”143 First, Justice Stevens
noted that Davis’ case satisfied the “exceptional circumstances” requirement
of Rule 20 because there was a “substantial risk of putting an innocent man
to death,” and that alone was sufficient justification to require the district
court to hold an evidentiary hearing.144 Second, Justice Stevens contended
that the district court may be able to grant relief despite the extreme
deference required by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).145 Justice Stevens invited the
district court to conclude that section 2254(d)(1) either “does not apply” to
129

Id. at 827.
Id. at 823 (internal quotations omitted). The Court explained that in order to accommodate Davis’
freestanding actual innocence claim, the statute would have to be “read to say that the new evidence must
‘be sufficient to establish clear and convincing evidence that, but for the fact that the applicant was
actually innocent, no reasonable factfinder would have found the applicant guilty of the underlying
offense.’” Id.
131
Id. at 824.
132
Id. at 823.
133
Davis V, 130 S. Ct. 1 (2009).
134
Id.
135
Id. at 2.
136
Id. at 1.
137
SUP. CT. R. 4.1. The Court’s open session begins on the first Monday in October. Id.
138
Davis V, 130 S. Ct. at 1.
139
Id.
140
Id. at 1–3 (Stevens, J., concurring).
141
Id. at 2 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
142
Id. at 1.
143
Id. at 4 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[T]his Court sends the District Court for the Southern District of
Georgia on a fool’s errand.”) (emphasis added).
144
Id. at 1 (Stevens, J., concurring).
145
Id. at 1–2.
130

Published by eCommons, 2010

212

UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36:2

original writs or does not apply “with the same rigidity.”146 Alternatively,
Justice Stevens urged the district court to conclude that section 2254(d)(1)
was unconstitutional because its rigid standards gave such extreme
deference to state court decisions that it would bar relief for a death row
inmate who has established his innocence.147
To the contrary, Justice Scalia argued in his dissent that the
language of the AEDPA was plain and clearly precluded the district court
from granting relief on the transferred original writ.148 He further noted that
the Court should have ruled on the issue of whether the AEDPA was
constitutional when its application barred relief for a prisoner presenting an
actual innocence claim.149 Still, the Court left open the questions of whether
the AEDPA applied to original writs and whether the Act applied to actual
innocence claims.150
III. ANALYSIS
The AEDPA fails to mention the Court’s authority to entertain
original writs151 as well as an exception for actual innocence claims.152
These omissions plant the seed of uncertainty in the federal courts and
punish potentially innocent men. The federal courts are uncertain as to: (1)
whether section 2254(d)(1) precludes it from granting relief on transferred
original writs;153 or (2) whether section 2254(d)(1) employs a procedural bar
against prisoners who are sentenced to death, but have evidence that may
demonstrate their innocence.154
As the following analysis demonstrates, the AEDPA’s limitations
on federal writs of habeas corpus should not apply to petitions for original
writs of habeas corpus filed under the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction.
At the very least, the AEDPA’s limitations should not apply to actual
innocence claims. While Congress may have intentionally and correctly
failed to mention any of the Court’s authority to entertain original writs in
the AEDPA, Congress erred in its failure to include an exception for actual
innocence claims.

146

Id. at 1.
Id. at 1.
Id. at 2 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Insofar as it applies to the present case, [2254(d)(1)] bars the
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus . . . .”).
149
Id. at 4.
150
See id. at 2 (Stevens, J., concurring).
151
See Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 660 (1996) (“No provision of Title I mentions our authority to
entertain original habeas petitions . . . .”).
152
Davis V, 130 S. Ct. at 1.
153
See In re Davis (Davis VI), No. CV409-130, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75894, at *1–2 (S.D. Ga.
Aug. 26, 2009) (ordering the parties to file briefs in order to aid the court in determining whether
2254(d)(1) applies to original writs filed under the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction).
154
See supra Part II.
147
148

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol36/iss2/3

2011]

IS SAVING AN INNOCENT MAN A “FOOL’S ERRAND”?

213

A. Section 2254(d)(1) and the Original Writ
Section 2254(d)(1) forecloses the power of federal courts to remedy
wrongful convictions on transferred writs that originated under the Court’s
original jurisdiction.155 Prior to petitioning for federal habeas corpus relief,
a state prisoner will likely have had his claim adjudicated on its merits in
state court proceedings as in the Davis case.156 Thus, Congress’ attempt to
curb abuse of the writ effectively eliminates a remedy, as section 2254(d)
precludes federal courts from granting a prisoner’s petition for habeas
corpus if a state court adjudicated the claim on its merits in a state court
proceeding.157 Section 2254(d) offers two exceptions,158 which completely
undercut the federal courts’ ability to grant relief even if the state court erred
because the statute requires federal courts to deny relief, unless the state
court unreasonably applied clearly established federal law.159
1. The Unreasonable Standard of Section 2254(d)(1)
The unreasonable standard required by section 2254(d)(1) is a rigid
standard that bars relief for potentially innocent men.160 A district court that
conducted an evidentiary hearing on a transferred original writ may not
grant relief to a prisoner if—in the court’s independent judgment—the state
court erroneously or incorrectly applied clearly established federal law.161
This standard’s extreme deference to state court’s prior rulings sends up red
flags, which caught the Court’s attention in Davis.162
155
See Davis V, 130 S. Ct. at 2–3 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (asserting that the Court’s transfer of Troy
Davis’ original petition for habeas corpus would serve no purpose because “[e]ven if the District Court
were to be persuaded by Davis’ affidavits, it would have no power to grant relief.”).
156
The requirement is subject to exception when “it appears that . . . (i) there is an absence of
available state corrective process; or (ii) circumstances exist that render such process ineffective to
protect the rights of the applicant.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(B); see Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 690
(2004); see also Doyle, supra note 19, at 16 (“The AEDPA preserves the exhaustion requirement . . . .”)
(internal citation omitted).
157
See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
158
See id. § 2254(d)(1)–(2). The two exceptions are as follows:
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable
application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme
Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the
facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.
Id.
159
Capitol Hill Hearing, supra note 70, at 24 (statement by Kogan).
160
See Davis V, 130 S. Ct. 1 (2009); see also Capitol Hill Hearing, supra note 70, at 7 (statement of
Henry C. “Hank” Johnson, Representative from Ga. and Member, Subcomm. On the Constitution, Civil
Rights, and Civil Liberties).
161
Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003) (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 410–13
(2000)). “Under § 2254(d)(1)’s unreasonable application clause, then, a federal habeas court may not
issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant statecourt decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly.” Id. at 75–76 (internal
citations and quotations omitted) (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 411).
162
See Davis V, 130 S. Ct. at 1 (Stevens, J., concurring) (suggesting to the district court that §
2254(d)(1) may be unconstitutional because it is a rigid standard that would bar relief for an innocent
man).
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In Davis, the Court realized that once it transferred the original writ
to the district court for an evidentiary hearing, the court could not grant
relief, even if persuaded by Davis’ affidavits, due to the high deference
given to a state court’s decision as required by section 2254(d)(1).163 Justice
Scalia asserted in his dissent that by transferring the original writ to the
district court, the Court was sending the district court on “a fool’s errand”164
because section 2254(d)(1) made it “impossible for the District Court to
grant any relief.”165 To the contrary, Justice Stevens, who authored the
concurring opinion, contended that the district court could either deem the
section unconstitutional or “may conclude that § 2254(d)(1) does not apply
or does not apply with the same rigidity, to an original habeas petition such
as [Davis’ petition].”166 Justice Stevens’ assertions to the district court in
Davis were far from the Court’s prior stance on the unreasonable standard in
section 2254(d)(1). In fact, prior to Davis, the Court repeatedly applied the
unreasonable standard, without questioning its constitutionality.167
The Court’s avoidance of whether the AEDPA applied to original
writs may have called the Act’s constitutionality into question.168 In
avoiding the issue which may have rendered the Act unconstitutional, the
Court unanimously held that the AEDPA’s limitations do not suspend the
writ in violation of Article I, Section 9, Clause 2 of the United States
Constitution because the Court was still able to entertain original writs.169
Notwithstanding this holding, Justice Souter, in his concurrence—joined by
Justices Stevens and Breyer in Felker, does provide that the constitutionality
of the AEDPA would come into question if other statutory avenues, other
than certiorari, were foreclosed.170
2. Congressional Intent
Since the AEDPA’s enactment, an original writ has become an
163
Id. (Stevens, J., concurring) (suggesting that if the court found that § 2254(d)(1) applies, then the
court could hold that the section was unconstitutional because it barred relief to a death row inmate who
established his innocence); id. at 4 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Sending [the original writ] to a district court
that ‘might’ be authorized to provide relief, but then again ‘might’ be reversed if it did so, is not a
sensible way to proceed.”).
164
Id. at 4 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
165
Id. at 2 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
166
Id. at 1 (emphasis added).
167
See Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 380–81 (2005); see also Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510,
520 (2003); Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75–76 (2003); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 411
(2000); Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 27 (2003); Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133, 141–42 (2005);
Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 74–77 (2006).
168
See Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 662–63 (1996) (“These restrictions apply without
qualification to any ‘second or successive habeas corpus application under section 2254.’ Whether or not
we are bound by these restrictions, they certainly inform our consideration of original habeas petitions.”)
(internal citations omitted).
169
Id. at 654.
170
Id. at 667 (Souter, Stevens, & Breyer, JJ., concurring) (“[I]f it should later turn out that statutory
avenues other than certiorari for reviewing a gatekeeping determination were closed, the question
whether the statute exceeded Congress’ Exception Clause power would be open.”).
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alternative to petitioning the lowest federal courts for habeas corpus relief in
an effort to avoid the rigid standards of section 2254(d)(1).171 Davis’ case
has been the first to test that theory.172 Despite the lack of precedence on the
issue, Justice Stevens’ concurring opinion asserts that Congress may not
have intended section 2254(d)(1) to apply to original writs; or if so, not with
the same rigidity as other federal writs of habeas corpus.173
If Congress intended such an important change in the exercise of the
Court’s jurisdiction over original writs, the text of the AEDPA would be
clearer. First, since Congress conferred power to the Court to issue original
writs in 1789, the Court has never been divested of any of its original habeas
authority.174 Congress does have the authority to regulate the Court’s
appellate jurisdiction. However, throughout history, the Court has protected
its habeas jurisdiction by construing narrowly Congressional attempts to
eliminate its authority.175 Second, Title I of the AEDPA does not mention
the Court’s authority to entertain original habeas petitions.176 This omission
leaves a reader of the Act to infer that section 2254(d)(1) is not applicable to
original writs. In Davis, Justice Scalia dismissed Justice Stevens’
argument.177 Justice Scalia asserted that the text of section 2254(d)(1)
covers all federal habeas petitions.178 However, a unanimous Court in
Felker side-stepped the constitutionality of the Act when it concluded that
the Court’s original jurisdiction was not repealed by implication because
Title I of the AEDPA did not specifically mention the Court’s authority to
entertain original writs.179
Furthermore, the Act’s purpose makes it clear that Congress
intended the Act not to apply to original writs. The purpose of the Act was
to remedy prior problems in the federal habeas law.180 The avenues
Congress desired to use to effectuate this purpose are seemingly clear from
the language and the intentional omission of the Court’s authority to
entertain original writs. Congress amended section 2254(d)(1) to require
federal courts to give more deference to a state court’s prior ruling in an
effort to curb abuses of the writ and to add finality to the federal habeas
171
See Hack, supra note 62, at 177 (exploring avenues of relief that may be available to state
prisoners, other than § 2254, in order to avoid the high standards of deference of § 2254(d)).
172
The Supreme Court has not acted on an original writ since Congress enacted the AEDPA. See
supra Part II.A.
173
Davis V, 130 S. Ct. 1 (2009).
174
See Palmore v. Superior Court of D.C., 515 F.2d 1294, 1301 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (explaining
Congress expanded the Court’s original habeas jurisdiction by allowing the Court to transfer the writ,
instead of denying it on factual issues).
175
Id. at 1301; see also Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 660–61 (declining to find a repeal of the
Court’s original habeas authority by implication); Ex parte Yerger, 75 U.S. 85, 106 (1869) (rejecting the
suggestion that the Act of 1867 repealed the Court’s habeas authority by implication).
176
Felker, 518 U.S. at 660–61.
177
Davis V, 130 S. Ct. at 3.
178
Id.
179
Felker, 518 U.S. at 660–61.
180
Doyle, supra note 19, at 10–12.
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review procedure.181 Congress sought to reform habeas corpus law, in part,
from complaints of abuse of the writ from federal judges.182 Those
complaints, however, never mentioned abuses of the original writ, as it was
a less-traveled path and rarely granted. Additionally, the lack of deference
was due to a lower federal court’s ability to review de novo a state court’s
prior ruling and employ its own independent interpretation of federal law.183
Congress sought to accomplish finality by placing a new constraint—the
unreasonable standard—on a federal habeas court’s ability to grant a state
prisoner’s application for a writ of habeas corpus.184 In contrast, the
Supreme Court continues to have a wide range of discretion in exercising its
original habeas corpus jurisdiction.185 Additionally, it was not Congress’
intent to foreclose the power of federal courts to remedy wrongful
convictions on transferred original writs. Section 2254(d)(1), which
precludes federal courts from providing a remedy on transferred original
writs, contradicts the transfer authority Congress gave the Court as an
alternative to denying original writs that involved factual issues.
B. Section 2254(d)(1) Should Not Apply to Actual Innocence Claims
The Supreme Court issued a one-paragraph opinion that transferred
Davis’ original writ to the district court.186 As Justice Scalia acknowledged,
the Court’s opinion lacked explanation and “meaningful guidance.”187 The
opinion cast a cloud of doubt over the constitutionality of section 2254(d)(1)
as it pertains to actual innocence claims; however, the Court did not declare
the section unconstitutional, and the concurring opinion only offered an
invitation for the district court to conclude as much.188 The Court created
more uncertainty on the state of the law and how the lower courts should
apply section 2254(d)(1), if the section applies to actual innocence claims at
all.189 If the Court had resolved the question of the constitutionality of
section 2254(d)(1), as it pertains to actual innocence claims, then potentially
innocent men would not be faced with procedural bars that would continue
their imprisonment or death sentences.
Section 2254(d)(1), as enacted by Congress in 1996, does not

181

Id. at 14–15.
Id. at 7.
Id. at 11.
184
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000) (“In sum, § 2254(d)(1) places a new constraint on
the power of a federal habeas court to grant a state prisoner’s application for a writ of habeas corpus with
respect to claims adjudicated on the merits in state court.”).
185
SUP. CT. R. 20.1.
186
Davis V, 130 S. Ct. 1 (2009).
187
Id. at 4 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
188
Id. at 1 (Stevens, J., concurring).
189
See Hooks v. Branker, 348 F. App’x 854, 860 (4th Cir. 2009). The Hooks court, despite the
Supreme Court’s decision in Davis, affirmatively concluded that “the Supreme Court has never
recognized” an actual innocence claim “as a meritorious ground for habeas corpus.” Id.
182
183
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contain an exception for claims of actual innocence.190 Actual innocence
claims are not distinguished under section 2254(d)(1) from other claims that
allegedly produce a wrongful conviction.191 Thus, when a state prisoner
presents an actual innocence claim and it is rejected on its merits, habeas
relief may only be granted if one of the two exceptions to section 2254(d)
apply.192 Section 2254(d)(1) does not mention actual innocence claims.193
Therefore, a prisoner must show that the state court’s ruling was contrary to,
or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court.
A state court’s rejection of a prisoner’s actual innocence claim is not
contrary to clearly established federal law.194 The Supreme Court has never
recognized a prisoner’s claim for actual innocence as valid.195 The Court
“has never held that the Constitution forbids the execution of a convicted
defendant who has had a full and fair trial but is later able to convince a
habeas court that he is ‘actually’ innocent.”196 Thus, a state court cannot
contradict or unreasonably apply a law that the Court has never recognized
as valid.197 Therefore, the omission in section 2254(d)(1) of an exception
for actual innocence claims leads to absurd results, such as killing a
potentially innocent man because his claim may not show that the state
court’s ruling was either contrary too or an unreasonable application of
clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court.198
This absurd result, which the statute produces, is why section
2254(d)(1) should not apply to actual innocence claims. The Eighth
Amendment precludes “cruel and unusual punishment[] . . . .”199 Prior to
Davis, the Court never explicitly concluded whether a death-row inmate had
a right not to be executed if he was innocent.200 However, the Second
Circuit in Triestman cast doubt on the statute’s constitutionality to the extent
that it may bar potentially innocent men from presenting evidence that
would establish their innocence.201 Specifically, the Triestman court
190

See Davis V, 130 S. Ct. at 3 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also id. n.* (“[O]ther arguments as to why
§ 2254(d)(1) might be inapplicable . . . that it contains an exception (not to be found in its text) for claims
of actual innocence—do not warrant a response.”).
191
Id.
192
Id. at 2 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
193
See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)–(2).
194
Davis V, 130 S. Ct. at 3 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
195
Id.
196
Id. at 7.
197
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412–13 (2000).
198
Capitol Hill Hearing, supra note 70, at 24 (statement of Kogan) (testifying that a possible
outcome of In re Davis is that “it is entirely possible that a man who has proven that he is actually
innocent will be denied relief and put to death—because the federal courts may be unable to say that a
state court decision rejecting his claim was unreasonably wrong at the time the state court acted.”)
(emphasis in original).
199
U.S. CONST. amend VIII.
200
Capitol Hill Hearing, supra note 70, at 46 (statement of Blume).
201
Triestman v. United States, 124 F.3d 361, 363 (2d Cir. 1997).
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concluded that “serious constitutional questions would arise if a person who
can prove his actual innocence on the existing record—and who could not
have effectively raised his claim of innocence at an earlier time—had no
access to judicial review.”202 Today, executing an innocent man should be
considered cruel and unusual punishment.203 As Davis illustrates, the
AEDPA, as it is applied today, should be deemed unconstitutional to the
extent that it would allow an innocent American to be executed, because it
prevents him from presenting his compelling new evidence that would
establish his innocence.204 The notion of executing innocent men who could
prove their innocence, but a statute bars their opportunity to do so, is
inhumane.205 The Court sent a message when it transferred Davis’ original
writ to the district court in light of noticeable procedural bars that the
execution of a potentially innocent man does offend the Constitution.206
Furthermore, Justice Stevens recognized in his concurring opinion that
section 2254(d)(1) is a rigid standard and if it barred relief to a death row
inmate who had established his innocence then it should be deemed
unconstitutional.207
However, the Court sent a clear message to Congress by taking such
an extraordinary step in Davis’ case.208 On November 3, 2009, Mr. Henry
C. “Hank” Johnson, Jr. introduced House Resolution 3986, a bill to amend
Title 28 of the United States Code,209 to “clarify the availability of Federal
habeas corpus relief for a person who is sentenced to death though actually
innocent . . . .”210 H.R. 3986 is commonly referred to as the “Effective
202

Id. at 363.
See Capitol Hill Hearing, supra note 70, at 46 (statement of Stephen F. Hanlon, Chair, Am. Bar
Ass’n Death Penalty Moratorium Project Steering Comm.).
204
Id. (statement of Blume) (stating at a hearing on Bill 3986 that proposes to amend § 2254 that he
believes that “Davis speaks clearly to the fact that there is now a constitutional right not to be executed
while you are innocent. Thus this Committee has and the Congress has the power to pass it and I think
also to influence the decision of what is the standard for innocence, which is something this bill takes
on.”).
205
Id. at 7 (statement of Johnson) (“As the law stands today, death row inmates can be stranded in a
procedural no man’s land, condemned to die, even if there is compelling new evidence and even if their
habeas lawyers were ineffective in some way. Imagine that, in America, you can be killed by the state
without new evidence of your innocence ever getting a hearing. The status quo is inhumane,
unconstitutional, and unacceptable.”).
206
See Davis V, 130 S. Ct. 1, 1 (2009)
207
Id.
208
See Capitol Hill Hearing, supra note 70, at 32 (statement of Michael E. O’Hare, Supervisory
State’s Attorney, Civil Litigation Bureau, Office of the Chief State’s Attorney, Connecticut).
209
Effective Death Penalty Appeals Act, H.R. 3986, 111th Cong. (2009). The bill is sponsored by
Henry “Hank” Johnson, Jr. (D-GA), and originally cosponsored by Jerrold Nadler (D-NY), John
Conyers, Jr. (D-MI), Robert “Bobby” C. Scott (D-VA), Anthony Weiner (D-NY), John Lewis (D-GA),
and Sheila Jackson-Lee (D-TX). Id. Prior to the Court’s opinion in Davis, H.R. 3320 was introduced to
eliminate a prisoner’s requirement of making a motion to the court of appeals before filing a second or
subsequent petition for habeas corpus when there are newly discovered accounts by credible witnesses
who recant prior testimony or establish improper action of state or federal agents. Justice for the
Wrongfully Accused Act, H.R. 3320, 111th Cong. (2009). The bill was introduced to amend 28 U.S.C. §
2244(b)(3) and § 2243. Id. The bill has a single cosponsor. Id. Thus, the fact that this bill was prior to
the Court’s ruling, it did not receive as much support as H.R. 3986.
210
155 CONG. REC. 12,287 (2009).
203
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Death Penalty Appeals Act.”211
H.R. 3986 proposes that section 2254(d) be revised to add a third
exception for actual innocence claims.212 The current proposal eliminates
the semicolon and “or” in section one and the period in section two.213
Additionally, H.R. 3986 proposes that section 2244(b) of the AEDPA be
amended to allow prisoners with actual innocence claims to have second or
successive habeas corpus applications in the federal courts.214 If the
language of this bill had been implemented in 2009, at the time Davis
applied to the Eleventh Circuit for authorization to file a second or
successive federal habeas petition, then it is very likely that the court would
have come to a different result.215
Congress has held hearings on the proposed bill H.R. 3986 to amend
section 2254(d)(1).216 The overall objective of the testimony was to
examine the impact of the federal habeas law and the impact on the death
penalty.217 On December 8, 2009, the testimony showed discontent with the
state of the federal habeas law and the extreme deference that federal courts
must give to state courts’ prior rulings.218 While the state of the law remains
211

H.R. 3986.
Id. (“(3) resulted in, or left in force, a sentence of death that was imposed without consideration of
newly discovered evidence which, in combination with the evidence presented at trial, demonstrates that
the applicant is probably not guilty of the underlying offense.”).
213
Id.
214
Id. The proposed language to amending 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) is as follows:
A claim that an applicant was sentenced to death without consideration of newly
discovered evidence which, in combination with the evidence presented at trial,
could reasonably be expected to demonstrate that the applicant is probably not
guilty of the underlying offense may be presented in a second or successive habeas
corpus application.
Id.
215
See Davis IV, 565 F.3d 810, 823 (2009). The Court explained that in order to accommodate
Davis’ freestanding actual innocence claim, the statute would have to be “read to say that the new
evidence must ‘be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that, but for the fact that the
applicant was . . . actually innocent, no reasonable factfinder would have found the applicant guilty of
the underlying offense.’” Id. (emphasis in original). The court’s language of how the statute would have
to be read in order to grant Davis relief is directly aligned with H.R. 3986. But see In re Davis (Davis
VII), No. CV409–130, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87340, *1–2 (Aug. 24, 2010) (recognizing a prisoner’s
freestanding actual innocence claim as valid by holding that “executing an innocent person would violate
the United States Constitution . . . .”).
216
See, e.g., Capitol Hill Hearing, supra note 70.
217
Id. at 1.
218
See, e.g., id. at 23-25 (statement of Kogan) (“We cannot as a civilized society tell these people
you don’t have any more rights because it is procedurally barred. . . . But still I say that our system must
provide all the safeguards that we possibly can in regards to preserving that very, very sacred writ of
habeas corpus. And I think that Congress needs to reexamine the situation and come up with a
comprehensive law.”); id. at 40 (statement of Blume) (The Fifth Circuit agreed that an attorney’s
performance was unreasonable and agreed that it was prejudicial, yet “they said they could do nothing
because while the State court decision was wrong, it was not so off the mark and thus AEDPA tied their
hands. Again, that should not be allowed. If there is a constitutional violation the Federal court should
have the power to remedy it. This court should go beyond just the question of innocence, engage in
sweeping reform and untie the hands of the Federal courts and allow them to get down to the business of
remedying constitutional error.”); id. at 44 (statement of Nadler) (“[I]t is now obvious that capital habeas
[corpus] . . . now take[s] twice as long as [it] did prior to [the] AEDPA’s enactment.”); id. at 45
(statement of Blume) (“I would suggest that 2254(d) be eliminated.”).
212
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in limbo, the Court and Congress run the risk of innocent men dying
because of procedural bars that are incorporated in section 2254(d)(1).
V. SAVING AN INNOCENT MAN IS NOT A FOOL’S ERRAND
Actual innocence is not enough—this is the current state of the
federal habeas law under the AEDPA.219 If a court’s error is insufficient to
grant habeas relief to an innocent man sentenced to die, then Congress has
overstepped its authority and grossly overreached its goal to limit the grant
of the writ. Congress erred in omitting an exception for actual innocence
claims in the AEDPA. It has become critical to pass H.R. 3986 because
innocent men are being denied relief from wrongful convictions.
Additionally, it is “an atrocious violation of our Constitution and the
principles upon which it is based to execute an innocent person.”220 Today,
the current state of federal habeas law operates to do just that—execute an
innocent person.
The Davis case illustrates a state prisoner’s journey through the
legal system; showing how a writ of habeas corpus is an innocent prisoner’s
last attempt to get a conviction and life imprisonment or death sentence
overturned.221 Justice Scalia characterized the Court as sending the district
court on “a fool’s errand.”222 Justice Stevens suggested and referenced legal
principles that, unfortunately, do not currently exist in American
jurisprudence because he thought that the AEDPA should include an
exception for actual innocence claims. So was transferring an original writ
to the district court a fool’s errand, if section 2254(d)(1) precluded the court
from granting relief? No. The Court’s decision has operated to save
potentially innocent men from irreversible error—death. Thus, Justice
Stevens’ opinion is brilliant in the fact that it sent a message to Congress,
which made them go back to the drawing board and draft legislation that
will carve out an exception for actual innocence claims. This will prevent
potentially innocent men, like Troy Davis, from being executed because of
rigid procedural bars such as those in section 2254(d)(1). Congress did not
mention the Court’s authority in Title I of the AEDPA because section
2254(d)(1) would foreclose the power of federal courts to remedy wrongful
convictions, such as Troy Davis’ conviction. Section 2254(d)(1) should not
apply to original writs or actual innocence claims because it was not
Congress’ intent to kill innocent men. In America, preservation of an
innocent man’s life is not a fool’s errand.

219

Davis IV, 565 F.3d at 823 (Section 2244(b)(2) is “an ‘actual innocence plus’ standard.”).
Davis V, 130 S. Ct. 1, 1-2 (2009) (Barkett, J., dissenting) (quoting Davis IV, 565 F.3d at 830)
(internal quotations omitted).
221
See Davis V, 130 S. Ct. at 3–4 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
222
Id. at 4.
220
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